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Refugees and asylum 
JAMES C. HATHAWAY' 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European governments 
enacted a series of immigration laws under which international migration was 
constrained in order to maximise advantage for States. These new, largely self-
interested laws clashed with the enormity of a series of major population djsplace-
ments within Europe, including the flight of more than a million Russians between 
1917 and 1922, and the exodus during the early 1920s of hundreds of thousands of 
Armenians from Turkey. The social crisis brought on by the de facto immigration of 
so many refugees - present without authorisation in countries where they enjoyed 
no protection and no ability to support themselves legally - convinced European 
governments that the viability of the overall migration control project depended on 
building into that regime a needs-based exception for refugees. Providing specif-
ically for refugees would legitimate what was, in any event, an unstoppable 
phenomenon; it would thus reinforce the viability of the protectionist norm. 
Equally important, enfranchising those who were unlawfully present would defuse 
social tensions in States of reception and position refugees to make a positive 
contribution to their new societies. 
7.1 . THE EVO LUTI ON OF INTE RN ATI ONAL REFU GEE LAW 
177 
Between 1920 and 1950, the League of Nations and other intergovernmental bodies 
were given the task of administering refugee protection, commencing with the 
mandate of Fridtjof Nansen in the 1920s. Thjs was an extraordinarily fl uid era, 
with the refugee definition evolving from an initial focus on groups of de Jure 
stateless persons; then refocussing on groups of persons who were de facto disfran-
chised (i.e., deprived of the substantive benefits of nationality) under the National 
Socialist regime in Germany; and, in the post-war era, embracing individuals in 
I The assistance of Research Scholar Sim one Alt is acknowledged with appreciation. Portions of this analysis draw on 
the author's earlier work, in particul a r: James Hathaway, Th e Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, 1991); 
James Hathaway, Th e Righ ts of Refugees under lntemational La w (Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2005). Cases referred 
to herein may be accessed on the Refu gee Caselaw Sire (www.refugeecaselaw.org). 
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search of escape from perceived injustice in their home State.2 Not only did the 
defmition of a refugee shift from a juridical, to a social, and fmally to an individualist 
perspective, but the actual rights guaranteed to refugees under the succession of 
refugee treaties also changed over time. Drawing on the normative structures of 
international law of aliens and the interwar minorities treaties, the duties owed to 
refugees were sometimes defmed in mandatory terms, sometimes as benchmarks to 
be strived for. The critical duty of non-refoulement - not to return refugees to a 
territory where they may face persecution - first appeared in 1933. 3 But the predom-
inant focus of refugee treaties was on ensuring access to key socio-economic rights -
for example, relief from foreign labour restrictions, access to education, and the right 
to receive medical and welfare benefits. International agencies were not engaged 
simply in oversight, but were the lead entities entrusted with protecting refugees. 
7.1.1. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
The primary standard of refugee protection today is the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1951) {'Refugee Convention'), to which roughly 80 per cent of 
the world's States have bound themselves.4 While the Refugee Convention provides 
for the continuing protection of all persons deemed to be refugees under any of the 
earlier accords, its defmition is fundamentally individualist and forward-looking 
('a well-founded fear of being persecuted'), and limited to persons who have 
already fled their own country and whose risk derives from civil or political 
discrimination. When first adopted, States could restrict their commitments to 
pre-1951 and European refugees, though few in fact chose to do so. 
While clearly born of the strategic goals of Western States in the immediate 
post-Second World War era, an extraordinary judge-led commitment in the years 
since 1990 has ensured the continuing viability of this defmition to meet most 
modem needs. 5 A real strength of the Refugee Convention is its rights regime, 
2 James Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920- 1950' ( 1984) 33(2) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 348. 
3 Walter Kalin, Das Prinzip des Non-Refoulement(Lang, 1982); Gunnel Stenberg, Non-Expulsion and Non-
Refoulement (Iustus Forlag, 1989). 
4 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 [entered into force 22 
April 1954). The drafting history of the Refugee Convention is collected in Alex Takkenberg and Christopher Tabhaz 
(eds.). The Collected Travaux Preparatoires of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Dutch 
Refugee Council, 1989). 
5 Leading national analyses of refugee law have played a critical support role in this process of normative 
reinvigoration. See FredericTiberghien, La protection des rt'fugit's en France (Economica, 1988); Walter Kalin, 
Grundriss des Asylverfahrens (Helbing Et Lichtenhahn, 1990); Geoffrey Coll and Jacqueline Bhabha [eds.), Asylum 
Law and Practice in Europe and North America: A Comparative Analysis [Federal Publications, 1992); 
Vi tit Muntarbhorn, The Status of Refugees in Asia (Clarendon Press, 1992); Mary Crock (ed.), Protection or 
Punishment: The Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia (Federation Press, 1993); Helene Lambert, Seeking 
Asylum: Comparative Law and Practice in Selected European Countries (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995); Vincent Chetail 
and Vera Gowlland-Debbas (eds.), Switzerland and the International Protection of Refugees [Kluwer Law 
International, 2002); Nicholas Blake and Raza Husain, Immigration, Asylum and Human Rights [Oxford University 
Press, 2003); Mark Symes and Peter Jorro, Asylum Law and Practice [International Specialized Book Service, 2003); 
Mary Crock, Ben Saul and Azadeh Dastyari, Future Seekers II: Refugees and Irregular Migration in Australia 
(Federation Press, 2006); Mirko Bagaric et al., Migration and Refugee Law in Australia: Cases and Commentary 
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which not only guarantees such critical rights as non-penalisation for illegal entry, 
non-expulsion and non-refoulement, but provides for the most far-reaching guar-
antees of socio-economic rights granted to any category of non-nationals under 
international law. Read together with the subsequently enacted norms of interna-
tional human rights law, the refugee rights regime is an extraordinarily resilient 
and comprehensive normative structure. 
In exchange for these progressive commitments, however, the States that drafted 
the Refugee Convention insisted that they - not the international oversight agency, 
now the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ('UNHCR') - would 
control the refugee protection system. While State parties agree to cooperate with 
UNHCR in its duty to supervise the application of the Refugee Convention - and 
while UNHCR has leveraged its convention-based and statutory authority 
(described below, Section 7.1.4) to establish itself as both the leading source of 
normative guidance and a critical on-the-ground actor in less developed countries -
governments nonetheless remain the lead entities for refugee protection under the 
terms of the Refugee Convention. 
7.1.2. The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
-----
At the global level, the most critical legal development since the Refugee 
Convention was the advent of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1967) ('Protocol'). 6 This treaty eliminated the option for States to restrict protec-
tion efforts to pre-1951 refugees, or European refugees, or both. While the Protocol 
is sometimes said to have 'universalised' the Refugee Convention, it did not in fact 
vary the criteria of the Convention (a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of civil or political status) or broaden its rights guarantees (e.g. , to include a 
right to basic physical security). As such, many involuntary migrants in the less 
developed world remain excluded from the refugee regime where, for example, 
their flight is prompted solely by natural disaster, war, or broadly based political 
and economic turmoil, or where migration does not involve crossing an interna-
tional border. But because most States are parties to both the Refugee Convention 
and the Protocol,7 there is a legal duty to read the Convention's protection respon-
sibilities in the geopolitically and temporally inclusive way mandated by the 
Protocol: 
Because the Convention is universal, it does not speak only of the grounds of persecution that 
have been most familiar to Western countries ... [l]n other societies, and in modem· times, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007); Martin Jones and Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law(lrwin Law, 2007) ; Osamu Arakaki, 
Refugee Law and Practice in Japan (Ashgate, 2008) ; Deborah Anker, The Law of Asylum in the United States [West 
Group, 2011). 
6 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for accession 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 
October 1967). 
7 The Protocol incorporates by reference most of the provisions of the Refugee Convention. A small number of 
countries (including the United States} that are parties to the Protocol but not the Convention are thus bound to 
respect the Convention 's refugee definition and rights regime. 
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different cultural norms and social imperatives may give rise to different sources of 
persecution .... The concept is not a static one. Nor is it fixed by historical appreciation.8 
7 .1.3. Regional developments 
In addition to this duty to interpret global norms in an inclusive way, greater 
geopolitical inclusivity has also been promoted by regional organisations (see 
Chapter 14). The African Union administers the Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) ('OAU Convention').9 This 
treaty broke new ground by extending protection to all persons compelled to flee 
across national borders by reason of any man-made disaster. In contrast to the 
Refugee Convention, it does not require a link between risk and civil or political 
status, and extends protection to persons fleeing harm that affects only a portion of 
their country of origin. In 2009, the African Union also adopted binding norms on 
the protection of internally displaced persons, although these are not yet in force. 10 
A similar but somewhat more modest step was taken in Latin America via 
adoption of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984), approved by the 
Assembly of the Organization of American States ('OAS') in 1985. 11 While acknowl-
edging the refugee status of groups of persons fleeing widespread occurrences, the 
OAS standard does not extend protection to persons in flight from problems affecting 
only a part of their country of origin. Nor is it legally binding, though some States 
(e.g., Bolivia and Brazil) have incorporated it into their domestic law. 
The initial focus of activity in Europe was the Council of Europe, which recog-
nised the notion of de facto refugees in 1976. 12 The momentum today, however, is 
with the European Union, which has enacted binding directives commencing in 
2004 on the recognition of refugee status and a broader 'subsidiary protection' 
class, 13 detailing the content of protection and stipulating the procedures by which 
protection is to be implemented. 14 Expressly framed as 'minimum standards' and as 
subordinate to Refugee Convention requirements, since 2009 these directives have 
been interpreted and applied by the European Court of Justice. In contrast to the 
principled expansion at the root of African and Latin American initiatives, regional 
asylum activity in the European Union has been prompted by the protection 
dictates of European human rights law and, in particular, by the determination of 
8 Av. Minister for Immigration Et Ethnic Affairs ( 1997) 190 CLR 225, 293-4. 
9 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, opened for signature 10 September 1969, 
1001 UNTS 45 (entered into force 20 June 1974). 
10 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. adopted 23 
October 2009 (not yet in force). 
11 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, OEA/Ser.L/ll.66, doc IO rev I (22 November 1984) 190-3. 
12 Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 773 on the Situation of De Facto Refugees, Council of Europe (26 
January 1976). 
13 Elspeth Guild and Carol Harlow (eds.), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart, 
2001). 
14 Hemme Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006). 
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States to achieve regional harmonisation in refugee law. This has been required by 
national courts - especially those of the United Kingdom 15 - as a legal precondition 
for the allocation of asylum claims on a regional basis in Europe. 
7.1.4. The mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Beyond these formal legal developments, the institutional protection mandate of 
UNHCR now encompasses groups and forms of intervention that go significantly 
beyond its 1950 Statute, 16 as the result of 'good offices' and other mandates 
approved by the United Nations General Assembly and fmanced through voluntary 
contributions. These enhancements of its competence have enabled the agency to 
respond to mass movements of refugees outside Europe and, more controversially, 
to assume responsibility for internally displaced persons. UNHCR sees itself as 
responsible to respond not just to risks of being persecuted, but to any risk giving 
rise to a protection need in the context of involuntary migration. In pursuit of this 
extremely broad mandate, UNHCR has transformed itself into an operational 
agency in which the resources devoted to oversight of legal protection, while still 
significant, are dwarfed by the commitments made to relief on the ground. 
7.1.5. Complementary developments in human rights and humanitarian law 
Refugee-specific treaties and institutions at both the global and regional levels are 
also complemented in critical ways by broader norms of international human rights 
and humanitarian law. In particular, art. 3 of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), 17 and the 
prohibition in art. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
( 1966) ('ICCPR') 18 of subjection to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, provide the bases for an expanded category of persons entitled to 
benefit from the duty of non-refoulement. So too does art. 3 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 
at the regional level. 19 The 1949 Geneva Conventions that form the basis of modern 
international humanitarian law have also been interpreted to preclude the forced 
return of civilians to ongoing conflict.20 While claims that there is a comprehensive 
15 R v. Secretary of Sta te fo r tlie Home Department; Ex pa rte A dan and A itseguer (2000] UKH L 67 ( 19 December 
2000). 
16 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner f or Refu gees, UN Doc A/RES/428 (V) ( 14 December 
1950). 
17 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signa ture 
10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into fo rce 26 June 1987). 
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Righ ts, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 17 1 
(entered in to force 23 March 1976). 
19 European Convention f or the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom s, opened fo r s ignature 4 
November 1950, ETS No 005 (entered into fo rce 3 September 1953). 
20 In re Santos, US Imm. Ct. Dec. No A29-564- 78 I (24 August 1990) ; Orelien v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration] [ 19921 I FC 592. 
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duty of non-refoulement binding all States by force of customary law are over-
stated, 21 there is no doubt that many involuntary migrants outside the Refugee 
Convention defmition of a refugee are today entitled to treaty-based protection at 
the international or regional level. Equally important, many of these treaties can be 
relied on to expand the scope and quality of protection owed to classically defmed 
refugees, perhaps most importantly in the realm of civil and political rights. 
7.2. REFUGEE STATUS 
The refugee defmition - the central criterion of which is a 'well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership of a particular social group' - is to be interpreted purposively and in 
context, rather than literally. 22 To that end, interpretation is to promote an under-
standing of refugee law as surrogate or substitute national protection,23 owed to 
persons who can no longer benefit from the protection of their own country. 
As the House ofLords has observed, while each State party interprets the refugee 
definition independently, 'as in the case of other multilateral treaties, the Refugee 
Convention must be given an independent meaning ... without taking colour 
from distinctive features of the legal system of any individual contracting 
state. In principle therefore there can only be one true interpretation'.24 To this 
end, '[c]onsidered decisions of foreign courts, in particular appellate decisions, 
should be treated as persuasive in order to strive for uniformity of interpretation'. 25 
The lively transnational judicial conversation among judges - significantly aided 
by the International Association of Refugee Law Judges, established in 1997 - has 
proved to be the critical means by which interpretation of the refugee defmition has 
been continually updated, allowing it to be 'a living instrument in the sense that 
while its meaning does not change over time its application will'.26 
While some courts (and UNHCR) persist in recommending what is sometimes 
referred to as a 'holistic' interpretive method, by which a general sense of conformity 
to the defmition is sought, 'experience shows that adjudicators and tribunals give 
better reasoned and more lucid decisions if they go step by step'.27 Indeed, '[a]lthough 
the defmition must be read as a whole, each of the elements must be present'.28 
21 James Hathaway, 'Leveraging Asylum· (2010) 45(3) Texas International LawJounial 503. 
22 Av. Minister for Immigration a Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225. 
23 Canada (Attoniey General) v. Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689; Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2000] UKHL 37 (6 July 2000). 
24 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Er pa rte Adan and Aitseguer [2000] UKHL 67 ( 19 December 
2000). 
25 NBGM v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 60 (I 2 May 2006) 
[158]. 
26 Se pet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 15 (20 March 2003) [6]. 
27 Svazas v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 74 (31 January 2002) [30]. 
28 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Klzawar [2002] HCA 14 (I 1 April 2002) [147]. 
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There are six criteria that have to be fulfilled for a person to be a refugee: 
J the person has to be outside his or her country; 
2 due to a genuine risk; 
3 of the infliction of serious harm; 
4 resulting from a failure of state protection; 
5 which risk is causally connected to a protected form of civil or political status; and 
6 the person must be in need of and deserving of protection. 
7.2.1. Alienage 
The first element of refugee status under the Refugee Convention is that the 
claimant be outside his or her own country. The purpose of this alienage require-
ment is to defme the scope of refugee law in a realistic and workable way, dictated 
by the limited reach of international law. Equally important, the restriction of 
refugee status to persons outside their own country aligns with the treaty's rights 
regime, which is attuned precisely to the needs of involuntary aliens - and is, as 
such, not relevant to persons who are displaced internally. 
Refugee status is acquired as soon as a person leaves his or her own country for a 
relevant reason, though no State is obliged to protect the person until he or she 
comes under its formal or de facto jurisdiction. Protection is owed to a person 
meeting the defmition (whether or not status has been formally assessed) who is 
under a State party's jurisdiction. It matters not whether the entry or presence is 
lawful, and immigration penalties may not be imposed for unlawful entry or 
presence dictated by flight from persecution. 
There is also no duty on the part of refugees to seek protection either in their own 
region or in the first safe country to which they travel. Despite the proliferation of 
so-called 'country of first arrival rules', which purport to force refugees to seek 
protection in a single designated State, 29 a transfer of protective responsibility is 
lawful under the Refugee Convention only where effected in a timely way and 
without infringing the refugee's acquired rights (see below). If, and only if, these 
standards are met, protective responsibility may lawfully be transferred to ano~her 
State party, whether or not the refugee consents to that transfer. 
Assuming that no such transfer occurs, all criteria of the refugee defmition are 
assessed in relation to circumstances in the applicant's country of nationality, 
whatever the person's relationship with other States. A person with more than 
one nationality must satisfy the refugee defmition in relation to each country of 
29 Co uncil Regulation (EC) No 343/2003of18 February 2003 Establishing the Cri teria and Mechanisms for 
Determining the Member State Responsible for Exa mining an Asylum Application Lodged in one of the Member 
States by a Third-Country National ['Dublin U Regulation') [2003] OJ L 50/ I; Agreement between the Government of 
Canada and the Governm ent of the United States of America fo r Cooperation in the Exa mination of Refugee Status 
Claims f rom Nationals of Third Coun tries ['Safe Third Country Agreement') , Canada Gazette Vol 138 No 22 
[5 December 2002). 
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nationality, while a stateless person may qualify for refugee status if he or she can 
show a relevant fear of being persecuted in the 'country of former habitual resi-
dence' - that is, the de facto home, where he or she enjoyed an ongoing protective 
relationship.30 The goal in all cases is to restrict refugee status to persons deprived by 
persecution of the effective enjoyment of their most critical national bond. 
Finally, because the Refugee Convention is concerned not with past harms but 
with forward-looking risk, it protects on equal terms refugees sur place - that is, 
persons who, while already abroad, fmd they cannot return by reason of the risk of 
being persecuted at home. 
7.2.2. Genuine risk 
The requirement of a genuine risk follows from the applicant's duty to show that he 
or she is outside his or her own country 'owing to a well-founded fear'. Common 
law jurisprudence has taken the view that the 'well-founded fear' requires not only 
evidence of forward-looking assessment of objective risk, but also demonstration 
of subjective fear in the sense of trepidation. However, this two-pronged approach 
is neither historically defensible nor practically meaningful. 31 The concept of well-
founded fear is inherently objective, intended to restrict the scope of protection to 
persons who fear harm in the sense that they anticipate it may occur - that is, who 
can demonstrate a present or prospective risk of being persecuted, irrespective of 
the extent or nature of mistreatment, if any, that they have suffered in the past. This 
interpretation is not only consistent with the Refugee Convention 's drafting his-
tory, but the understanding of 'fear' as a forward-looking appraisal allows the 
English language text to conform to the objective focus of the equally authoritative 
French text, 'craignant avec raison'. 
Leading formulations of the well-founded fear test are 'reasonable possibility', 32 
'reasonable degree of likelihood',33 'serious possibility'34 and 'real chance'35 - all 
intended to identify situations of risk that fall significantly below a probability of 
harm, but which give rise to more than a speculative chance that persecution may 
ensue. 
The test is ordinarily met by some combination of credible testimony and 
country data. 36 There is no requirement of past persecution, though where such 
evidence exists it is usually good evidence of forward-looking risk. Nor is there any 
30 A stateless person who has no well-founded fear of being persecuted is not a refugee, but may be entitled to 
protection on the grounds of statelessness as such (see Chapter 4). 
31 Yusufv. Canada [1992) 1 FC 629; Win v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 132 (23 
February 2001), approved in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Islam [2001) FCA 1681 (20 
December 200 1). 
32 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421 ( 1987). 
33 R v. Secretary of State for tile Hom e Department; Ex parte Sivakumaran [1988) 1 All ER 193. 
34 Adjei v. Canada (Minisrer of Employment and Immigration) [ 1989] 2 FC 680. 
35 Chan v. Minisrer for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ( 1989) 87 ALR 412. 
36 See Gregor Noll (ed.), Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility Assessment in Asylum Procedures (Mattinus 
Nijhoff, 2005). 
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requirement for the applicant to show that he or she has been singled out or 
targeted; it suffices to show inclusion in a relevant at-risk group. 
7.2.3. Serious harm 
A person is a refugee only if he or she apprehends a form of harm that amounts to a 
risk of 'being persecuted'. This use of the passive voice (rather than 'persecution') 
signals the need to demonstrate a predicament of risk that calls for surrogate 
international protection. There is therefore strong support for the view that the 
risk of being persecuted requires evidence of 'sustained or systemic violation of 
basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection'. 37 
The fust element of this test- requiring the demonstration of a risk of'serious harm' 
in the sense of a risk to basic human rights - clearly does not restrict refugee status to 
persons able to show the possibility of consequences oflife or death proportions. The 
Refugee Convention accepts that deprivation of basic civil and political freedoms is 
sufficient cause for surrogate international protection. In addition, threats to core 
social and economic rights are increasingly recognised as persecutory: 
Ordinarily, denial of access to food, shelter, medical treatment and, in the case of children, denial 
of an opportunity to obtain an education, involve such a significant departure from the standards 
of the civilized world as to constitute persecution. And that is so even if the different treatment 
involved is undertaken for the purpose of achieving some legitimate national objective.38 
7 .2.4. Failure of State protection 
Because of the predicament-oriented nature of the requirement of 'being perse-
cuted', there must not only be demonstration of a risk to basic human rights, but 
also evidence that the individual's own State cannot or will not respond to that risk. 
If the applicant's own country can and will remedy the risk, the predicament of 
'being persecuted' does not exist. In a world in which many, perhaps most, threats 
emanate not from States but from non-State actors, this recognition is key t? the 
continuing vitality of the refugee defmition: 
[T]he discriminatory practice of the state is at least as important as the discriminatory practice 
of the attackers .... If there are thugs about perpetrating serious acts of maltreatment against 
the population as a whole, but the state offers protection only to some of its citizens, and not to 
others, in my view those citizehTaTe being-pers~cuted in just the sort of way that merits the 
surrogate protection of other states under the Convention. 39 
37 Canada {Attorney General} v. Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689; R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex pa rte Shah and Islam 
[1999] 2 AC 629; Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37 (6 July 2000); Sepet v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 15 (20 March 2003); R v. Special Adjudicator; E.r pa rte 
Ullah [2004] UKHL 26 ( 17 June 2004); Dov. Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department (2004) UKHL 26 (17 June 
2004); HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2010] UKSC 31 (7 July 2010) . 
38 Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19 (13 April 2000), [29]. 
39 Secretary ofStatefor the Home Departmentv. Horvath (1999] EWCA Civ 3026 (2 December 1999) [17]. 
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Even in those States that still embrace an understanding of 'being persecuted' 
focussed on the harm alone, there is increasing recognition that 'persecution consists 
of two elements, the criminal conduct of private cit izens, and the toleration or 
condonation of such conduct by the state or agents of the state, resulting in the 
withholding of protection which the victims are entitled to expect'.40 At the very 
least, such concerns are taken into account by virtue of the defmition's requirement 
that a refugee is a person who is 'unable or . .. unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection' of his or her country (art. l(A)(2)), though this approach raises difficulties 
meeting the defmition 's nexus requirement, which requires that the risk of 'being 
persecuted' be causally connected to a Refugee Convention ground. 
The standard of a 'failure of State protection' remains disputed. The formalistic 
view - that the focus is on whether the home State has' in place a system of domestic 
protection and machinery for the detection, prosecution and punishment of [rights 
abuse and] an ability and a readiness to operate that machinery'4 1 - does not 
conform with the Refugee Convention's focus on the realities of risk, which may 
persist despite the 'ability and readiness' to act. To be preferred therefore is the view 
that '[w]hatever the law provides and the officials attempt, ifthe country of nation-
ality is unable, as a matter of fact, to afford protection . . . the conclusion may be 
reached that "protection is unavailable" in the person's country of nationality.'42 
Also still the subject of some controversy is whether there can be said to be a 
failure of state protection where the individual - while at risk in his or her home 
region - could nonetheless move internally rather than seek protection as a refugee 
abroad. While there is little doubt that the Refugee Convention's focus on risk in 
'the country' of nationality requires consideration of internal alternatives to refugee 
status, the precise formulation of the test is unclear. It is generally agreed that the 
internal alternative must be accessible, must provide an antidote to the original risk, 
and must not present a new risk of being persecuted or of indirect return to the place 
of origin. The dominant view argues that, beyond these criteria, return need only 
be 'reasonable'. 43 However, the better view recognises that refugee status should not 
be subject to the whims of a 'reasonableness' test, given the Refugee Convention's 
requirement that a refugee 'is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country'.44 Rather, refugee status is fairly denied only 
where the home State will in fact provide protection, evidenced by ensuring respect 
for basic rights, in the proposed site of internal relocation. 45 
40 Minister fo r Immigrotion and Multicultural Affairs v. Kha war [2002] HCA 14 ( 11 Apri l 2002) [31 ]. 
41 Horvath v. Secreta ry of State fo r the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37 (6 July 2000). 
42 Re Min ister f or Imm igration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah [200 1] HCA 22 (3 May 200 1) [198] . 
43 Januzi v. Secretary of State fo r the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5 (1 5 February 2006); United Nations High 
Commissioner fo r Refu gees, "Gu idelines on International Protection: Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative (UN 
Doc HCR/G!P/03/04, UNHCR, 23 July 2003). 
44 See James Hathaway and Michell e Foster, 'In ternal Protection/Relocation/Flight Al ternative as an Aspect of 
Refu gee Status Determinat ion· in Erika Fell er, Volker Tiirk and Frances Nicholso n (eds.), Refugee Protection in 
In ternational La w (Cambridge Universi ty Press, 2003) 357, 381. 
45 Butler v. Attorney General [ 1999] NZAR 205. 
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7.2.5. Nexus to civil or political status 
If the peril a claimant faces cannot somehow be linked to his or her civil or political 
status ('race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion '), the claim to refugee status fails. Put succinctly, refugee law 
requires that there be a nexus between who the claimant is or what he or she believes 
and the risk of being persecuted in his or her home State (see Case Study 7 .1). 
A Refugee Convention ground need not be the sole, or even predominant, cause 
of the risk of being persecuted, though it must be a contributing factor to the risk. It 
also does not matter whether the risk accrues by reason of actual or (even incor-
rectly) imputed civil or political status, since in either case the non-discrimination 
logic of the nexus clause is engaged. 
But just what must be causally connected to the Refugee Convention ground? In 
those States that have adopted the bifurcated understanding of 'being persecuted' 
described above, the nexus can be to either of the two constituent elements - the 
serious harm or the failure of State protection - since in either case the predicament 
of 'being persecuted' is by reason of the Refugee Convention ground. But where the 
more limited notion of 'being persecuted' focussed on serious harm alone prevails, 
refugee status will not be recognised where the only discrimination is in relation to 
the duty to protect, rather than in the infliction of the harm as such. 46 This approach 
fails to do justice to the protective goals of refugee law,4 7 and has proved partic-
ularly problematic where the home State is unwilling to afford protection to women 
on the grounds of their sex (see Chapter 8).48 
The first ground of'race' includes all forms of identifiable ethnicity. Closely linked 
is the concept of 'nationality', which encompasses not only formal citizenship, but 
also linguistic groups and other culturally defmed collectivities. A risk is for reasons 
of 'religion' whether based on holding or refusing to hold any form of theistic, non-
theistic or atheistic belief; or on actions (such as worship or proselytisation) within 
the scope of religion, as adumbrated in international human rights law. 
While it is clear that the political 'opinion' ground does not require an individual 
to have acted on those beliefs, there is a lively debate about the breadth of what 
opinions (and cognate actions) are to be deemed 'political'. The traditional broad 
view comprising an opinion 'on any matter in which the machinery of state, 
government, and policy may be engaged'49 has been challenged on the grounds 
that while the Refugee Convention's understanding 'clearly is not limited to party 
politics . .. [i]t is probably narrower than the usage of the word in connection with 
the science of politics, where it may extend to almost every aspect of society. '50 
46 Imm igra tion and Natu ralization Service v. Elias Zaca rias, 502 US 478 ( 1992). 
47 Se pet v. Secreta ry of Stare fo r tl1e Home Depa rtment [200 1] EWCA Civ 681 ( 11 May 200 I). 
48 The contrary approach has been applied to the benefi t of fema le refugee claimants : R v. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal; E.r pa rte Sha h and Islam [1 999) 2 AC 629 ; Minister for Immigra tion and Mu lt ic:ultu ral Affairs v. Khawa r 
[2002) HCA 14 (I I April 2002). See also Heaven Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and Practice (Jordan, 2001 ); 
Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status (Ashgate, 2000). 
49 Canada (Atto rn ey General) v. Ward [1 993] 2 SCR 689, 693 . 
50 V v. Min ister fo r Imm igra tion and Multicultural Affairs (1999] FCA 428 ( 14 April 1999) (33]. 
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CASE STUDY 7. 1 Refugees expelled to North Korea 
Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans have fled into China since 1995, hoping to escape 
starvation and political repression (see Map 5.1). Critical food shortages are endemic in North 
Korea, with national resources distorted to support the country 's militarisation and political 
elite. Even access to basic healthcare and education often depends on demonstrated loyalty to 
the regime. 
Despite being a party to the Refugee Convention, China refuses to assess these protection 
claims. It instead stigmatises the North Korean arrivals as 'illegal economic migrants', 
refusing to provide them with even food or other essentials. China prohibits United Nations 
agencies, including UNHCR, from meeting these needs, and arrests any of its nationals found 
to be assisting North Koreans to survive. 
China, moreover, routinely removes North Koreans found in its territory, relying on a 1986 
bilateral repatriation agreement. Fear of forcible return drives many North Koreans 
underground, making them especially vulnerable to traffickers. 
In truth, the Chinese labelling of the North Koreans as ' illegal economic migrants' is legally 
ir relevant. Persons who face only a generalised risk of starvation are not Refugee Convention 
refugees because they cannot show that their risk, while grave, stems from one of the five 
Convention grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. But Convention refugee status is established if the risk derives from actual or 
implied political opposition to the regime and consequential denial of access to core economic 
rights. It is 'well-established that persecution can takethe form of economic deprivation as well 
as physical mistreatment'.s1 
More generally, so long as an individual or group faces the risk of being persecuted for a 
Refugee Convention reason, the fact that their flight to safety is partly motivated by 
economic destitution does not compromise their refugee status: Refugee status is to be 
recognised so long as 'the threat of persecution [is] a material reason, among a numberof 
complementary reasons'. 52 
Given that many (perhaps most) North Korean migrants are, therefore, refugees, they are 
entitled to benefit from arts. 2- 34 of the Refugee Convention - for example, access to 
rationing and other support systems, work and protection against refou/ement. China cannot 
plead its own failure to assess the claims, much less its bald assertion of non-refugee status, as 
grounds for failing to honour these obligations. Much less can it invoke a bilateral treaty with 
North Korea to justify breach of international responsibilities to refugees. 
Indeed, China is duty-bound to assist refugees to access their Refugee Convention rights 
(art. 25) and to cooperate with UNHCR's oversight of Convention rights (art. 35). But as this 
case study shows, the absence of any binding system to enforce the Refugee Convention makes 
it difficult to bring obligations to bear. Given UNHCR's political and fiscal vulnerability (only 
about 2 per cent of its annual income is guaranteed), there is presently little it can do when a 
powerful State such as China decides to breach its freely assumed duties. 
51 Chenv. Holder, 604 F 3d 324 (7th Cir, 2010), 334. 
52 HJ and HTv. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 (7 July 2010) [62] . 
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Most controversial of all is interpretation of the notion of 'membership of a 
particular social group' - an understandable controversy, since this concept was 
introduced with little explanation as a last-minute amendment to the Refugee 
Convention, and is not a recognised term of art. Construction based on the principle 
of ejusdem generis (requiring an ambiguous word to be interpreted in consonance 
with the meaning of words with which it forms a common class) has resulted in a 
focus on groups defmed by an immutable characteristic, aligning this ground with 
the other four grounds, all of which derive from norms of non-discrimination law. 
This approach has resulted in the recognition of, for example, sex or gender, sexual 
orientation and linguistic groups as 'particular social groups'.53 The alternative 
'social perception' test - which focusses on groups seen to be set apart from society, 
whether or not for a fundamental reason 54 - has gained traction in recent years. 
UNHCR has advocated an instrumentalist interpretation that requires recognition 
as a social group if either of the two tests is met. The European Union responded to 
this view by suggesting instead the need to meet both tests - meaning that even 
groups identified by their 'immutable characteristic ' are now potentially at risk of 
non-recognition as 'particular social groups'. 
7.2.6. Cessation and exclusion 
Because refugee protection is conceived as protection for the duration of the risk, 
art. IC of the Refugee Convention recognises several categories of persons 
deemed no longer to need international protection because they can once more 
benefit from the protection of their own country. Refugee status ceases in the case 
of a refugee who voluntarily and with full understanding seeks out diplomatic 
protection in his or her country of origin; who lost his or her original nationality 
but voluntarily elects to reacquire it; who re-establishes himself or herself in the 
country of origin, in the sense of resuming ongoing presence there; or who it is 
felt can and should return to the State of origin in view of a fundamental and 
demonstrably durable change of circumstances that restores protection to that 
person. 
Second, because refugee law is designed to afford surrogate international pro-
tection to those who need it, an individual who can already access an approved 
form of alternative surrogate protection is excluded from refugee status - namely, 
protection by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees 
in the Near East ('UNRWA') in the case of Palestinians (art. ID), or acquisition by 
any refugee of nationality or de facto nationality in a country that will protect that 
person (art. IE). 
53 Ca nada (A t1orney General) v. Ward [1 993] 2 SCR 689. adopting Ma tTer of Acosta, Uni ted States Board of 
Immi gra tion Appeals, A-24159781 (I March 1985). 
54 A v. Minister for Immigration Et Ethnic Affairs (1 997) 190 CLR 22 5. 
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Finally, in order to ensure that it is not sullied by the admission of persons 
understood to be undeserving of the benefits of refugee status, refugee status is 
denied under art. IF to persons reasonably suspected of being international 
criminals; of having acted contrary to the principles and purposes of the 
United Nations; or of having committed serious common crimes outside the 
asylum State that remain justiciable or in relation to which lawful punishment 
has yet to occur. There is regrettable confusion in practice between this last 
category and the broader authority under art. 33(2) to remove serious criminals 
on grounds of danger to the host country. Article 1 F is designed to ensure the 
alignment ofrefugee law with extradition law, thereby ensuring that asylum does 
not provide a haven to persons escaping the force of legitimate criminal 
prosecution or punishment. Article 33(2) permits State parties to send truly 
dangerous refugees away, even to their home country if necessary. But in contrast 
to the low threshold for exclusion that applies under art. lF(b) to persons evading 
legitimate criminal law prosecution or punishment abroad, art. 33(2) allows 
security-based removal only ifthere are 'reasonable grounds' for a determination 
of danger based on 'fmal' conviction for a crime that is 'particularly' serious -
thus striking a balance not possible under the peremptory exclusion provisions of 
art. I (F). 55 
7.3 . REFUGEE RIGHTS 
The universal rights of refugees today derive from two primary sources - the 
Refugee Convention itself and general standards of international human rights 
law. Despite the post-1951 development of a broad-ranging system of interna-
tional human rights law that can ordinarily be invoked by any person under a 
State's jurisdiction, the Refugee Convention rights remain critical to ensuring 
meaningful protection. 
First, general human rights norms do not address many refugee-specific con-
cerns (such as non-rejection at the frontier, or non-penalisation for illegal entry). 
Second, the economic rights in the Refugee Convention are both more extensive 
than those under general human rights law (e.g., binding rights to private property 
and to benefit from public relief and assistance) and are defined as absolute and 
immediately binding (in contrast to general human rights norms). Third, even in the 
realm of civil rights, where general human rights law is of greatest value to 
refugees, relevant provisions of the Refugee Convention speak to more specific 
concerns (such as access to the courts) than are assumed under general norms. 
Fourth, the ability to withhold civil rights during a national emergency is also much 
55 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US 415 (1999); Attorney-General v. Tamil X and 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2010] NZSC 107 (27 August 2010). 
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more limited under the Refugee Convention than under general human rights law, 
as a consequence of which refugees can invoke refugee-specific norms even when 
general standards are suspended under the ICCPR. Fifth, the Refugee Convention 
mandates rights that lead to solutions to refugeehood, reflecting an understanding 
that refugee status is inherently a temporary status - protection for the duration of 
risk - that must ultimately be brought to an end in the interests of both the refugee 
and the receiving State. 
7.3.1. Structure of entitlement 
Refugee rights inhere in consequence of one's refugee status. Refugee rights are not 
dependent on formal status recognition, reflected in the fact that State parties are 
actually under no duty formally to assess status, and many do not: 
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the 
criteria contained in the defmition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his 
refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make 
him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, 
but is recognized because he is a refugee. 56 
But this does not mean that all the rights stipulated in arts. 2-34 of the Refugee 
Convention are immediately owed to all persons who meet the refugee defmition. 
Under an ingenious system of'levels of attachment', refugees become entitled to an 
expanding array of rights as their relationship with the asylum State deepens. 57 At 
the lowest level of attachment, some rights (e.g., protection against refoulement 
and access to the courts) are owed to any refugee under a State's jurisdiction, in the 
sense of being under its control or authority. A second set of rights inheres 
when the refugee is physically present within a State's territory (e.g., restrictions 
on freedom of movement must be justified, and religious freedom rights accrue). 
Once a refugee is deemed to be lawfully present in a State, which may occur 
tacitly as well as by formal decision, a third group of rights applies (e.g., the right 
to take up self-employment, and freedom of internal movement). Fourth, when a 
refugee is lawfully staying, which may occur by effluxion of time, especially where 
no formal refugee status determination process exists, he or she becomes entitled to 
additional rights (e.g., the right to take up employment and to benefit from 
public housing). A fmal group of rights inheres in refugees who are durably resident 
in the asylum country (e.g., entitlement to legal aid and to exemption from 
legislative reciprocity requirements). The structure of the attachment system is 
incremental: because the levels build on one another (a refugee in a State's territory 
56 United Nations High Commissioner for Refu gees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria f or Determining Refugee 
Sta tus (UNHCR, 1992) [28] . 
57 The structure of entit lement is ex plained in detail in Hathaway, Th e Rights of Refugees under illtemational law, 
above n. I, 154 ff. 
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is also under its jurisdiction; a refugee lawfully present is also present; a refugee 
lawfully residing is also lawfully present; and a refugee durably residing is also 
lawfully residing), rights once acquired are retained for the duration of refugee 
status. 
Not only do refugee rights inhere incrementally, but the standard of compliance 
with such rights is defmed as a mix of absolute and contingent rights. At the very 
least, refugees receive the benefit of all laws and policies that apply to 'aliens 
generally'. But even rights defmed at this lowest level of compliance generally 
require that refugees receive 'treatment as favourable as possible', requiring State 
parties to give good faith consideration to the non-application to refugees of any 
restrictions generally applied to aliens. 
Most Refugee Convention rights mandate compliance at a significantly higher 
level. The rights to engage in non-political freedom of association and to engage 
in wage-earning employment, for example, must be guaranteed at the level 
granted to most-favoured foreign nationals - meaning that refugees are auto-
matically entitled to whatever standard any group of foreigners receives, includ-
ing under bilateral treaties, customs unions, and so on. Refugees must be 
assimilated to 'nationals' of the host country with regard to a significant range 
of rights, including education, welfare and social security. And there are some 
rights simply owed on an absolute basis - for example, administrative assistance 
(the duty of State parties to facilitate access to refugee right.s), protection 
against expulsion and access to refugee travel documents. Importantly, the 
Refugee Convention prohibits any discrimination between and among refugees, 
meaning that an asylum State may not grant preferential treatment to any subset 
of the refugee population unless shown to be reasonable and objectively 
justifia hie. 
The primary responsibility to implement these rights is attributed to State parties, 
which must both establish mechanisms of administrative assistance to facilitate 
access to the rights formally guaranteed, and provide refugees with access to their 
courts. In addition, art. 35 of the Refugee Convention requires States to cooperate 
with UNHCR in implementing Convention duties, and art. 38 allows referral to the 
International Court of Justice in the case of any dispute between States on the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, though this authority has never 
been exercised. In practice, regional courts exercising jurisdiction under cognate 
human rights treaties have also relied on Refugee Convention rights to interpret the 
application to refugees of broader norms. 
7.3.2. Non-refoulement 
The most urgent need of refugees is to secure entry into a territory in which 
they are sheltered from the risk of being persecuted. Yet this fundamental 
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concern must somehow be reconciled to the fact that nearly all of the earth's 
territory is controlled or claimed by governments which, to a greater or lesser 
extent, restrict access by non-nationals. Article 33's duty of non-refoulement -
'No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened' - is the primary response of the international community to this 
need, though it is less than a full affirmative right to receive asylum in at least 
two senses. 
First, the duty of non-refoulement only prohibits measures that cause refugees to 
'be pushed back into the arrns of their persecutors';58 it does not establish an 
affmnative duty to receive refugees. As an obligation 'couched in negative 
terms', 59 it applies only where there is a real risk that rejection will expose the 
refugee directly or indirectly to the risk of being persecuted for a Refugee 
Convention ground. In such circumstances, art. 33 often amounts to a de facto 
duty to admit the refugee, since admission is normally the only means of avoiding 
the alternative, impermissible consequence of exposure to risk. 
Second, because the de facto right of entry that flows from the duty of non-
refoulement is a function of the existence of a risk of being persecuted, a State 
party need not allow a refugee to remain in its territory if and when that risk 
ends.60 
As one of the rights that inheres on a provisional basis even before refugee 
status has been formally assessed, the duty of non-refoulement applies as soon as 
an individual claiming to be a refugee comes under the jurisdiction of a State 
party, and continues until he or she has been fairly determined not to be a refugee. 
It constrains not simply ejection from within a State's territory, but also non-
admittance. 61 A critical challenge in recent years is the adoption by many States 
of 'non-entree' policies, pursuant to which an effort is made to divert refugees 
away from their jurisdiction by indirect means (such as visa requirements), or by 
taking action outside their jurisdiction (including on the high seas) to force 
refugees back to their home State. The latter tactic - despite one worrisome 
precedent from the United States Supreme Court62 - is proscribed by the 
Refugee Convention's attribution of art. 33 duties on the basis of jurisdiction 
(rather than arrival in a State's territory) if the result is direct or indirect refoule-
ment (see Case Study 7.2). 
58 Statement of the Chairman Mr. Cliance of Canada, UN Doc E/AC.32.SR.2 I (2 February 1950) 7. 
59 Applicant MJB/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003) FCAFC 131 ( 13 
June 2003) [39]. 
60 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Er pa rte Thangarasa; R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; fa parte Yogathas [2002) UKHL 36 (17 October 2002). 
61 Gregor Noll, Negotiating Asylum: Tile EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection , and the Common Market of Deflection 
(Marti nus Nijhoff. 2000); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: Int ernational Refugee Law and t/1e 
Globalization of Migration Control (Cambridge University Press, 20 I I). 
62 Salev. Haitian Centers Council, 509 US 155 (1993). 
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CASE STUDY 7 .2 Extraterritorial deterrence: a way to avoid obligations? 
In May 2009, Italy implemented a policy of interdicting refugees and other migrants on 
board ships headed for its shores. Detection was facilitated by reports from 'Frontex', the 
European Union's agency charged with patrolling European Union sea borders. In most 
cases, the Italian Navy stopped ships believed to be destined for Lampedusa or other Italian 
territory, and forcibly transferred the passengers onto the Italian vessel. Once on board, the 
detained persons were not interviewed to assess any protection claims, but were summarily 
returned to North African ports. During the first three months of the programme Italy 
carried out seven operations, resulting in the return of at least 600 people to Libya and a 
smaller number to Algeria. 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture reported in April 2010 that 
among the migrants summarily repelled by Italy were persons registered as refugees with 
UNHCR. Many others from Somalia and Eritrea were later interviewed by UNHCR, which 
confirmed that they had plausible claims to international protection. 
Libya has no functioning national asylum system and is not a party to the Re~ugee 
Convention, though it is bound by the regional Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa (1969).63 Human Rights Watch reports that migrants forcibly 
returned there are subject to indefinite detention, and are often mistreated. 
In one of the few cases bya senior court to consider such a scheme, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Refugee Convention is silent on such extraterritorial action.64 This holding 
provoked a United States drafter of the Refugee Convention, the late Professor Louis Henkin, 
to retort that 
[ilt is incredible that states that had agreed not to force any human being back into the hands of his/her 
oppressors intended to leave themselves-and each other - free to reach out beyond their territory to 
seize a refugee and to return him/hertothe country from which he sought to escape.65 
Both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights66 and the English Court 
of Appea1 67 determined that the Sale Case was wrongly decided. First, the duty of 
non-refoulement in art. 33 is among a handful of critical rights that inhere as soon as 
a person claiming to be a refugee (or whose circumstances, including flight from a 
known refugee-producing State, suggest such status) comes under a State's de facto 
jurisdiction, including being on board a ship flying its flag . The protection obligations of 
Italy (and of Australia when operating its 'Pacific Solution ', as well as of the United States 
63 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, opened for signature 10 September 
1969, 1001UNTS45 (entered into force 20June1974). 
64 Salev. Haitian Centers Council, 509US155 (1993). 
65 Louis Henkin, Notes from the President (1993) 5 American Society of International Law Newsletter1 . 
66 Haitian Centre for Human Rightsv. United States. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. CEA/Ser.LIV/ 
11.95 Doc 7 rev at 550 (13March1997). 
67 R (European Roma Rights Centre)v. Immigration Officer at PragueAirport[2003] EWCACiv 666 (20 May 2003) 
[34]. In the House of Lords, Lord Hope nonetheless expressed some measure of support for the Sale decision: R v. 
Immigration Officer at Prague Airport; Ex parte European Roma Rights Centre [2004] UKHL 55 (9 December 
2004) (68]. 
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when it forc ibly interdicted Haitians fleeing the murderous Cedras regime) were thereby 
engaged. 
Second, the drafters of the Refugee Convention we re committed to ensuring 
that subterfuge could not be resorted to in order to avoid protection obligations, leading 
them to amend the draft treaty to set a duty of non-return ' in any manner whatsoever'. 
This was specifically said to embrace 'various methods by which refugees could be expelled, 
refused admittance or removed '.6 8 Extraterritorial deterrence is therefore as much a breach 
of the Convention as expulsion from within a State's territory. 
Even if refugees are not indirectly returned to their home countries (as in the case of those 
indefinitely detained in Libya), this does not makethe interdiction scheme lawful.When the 
refugees were forced on board the Italian vessel, they came under the jurisdiction 
of a State party, thereby acquiring several core refugee rights in addition to protection 
against refoufement. Because Libya is not a party to the Refugee Convention, but only to the 
African Union's regional refugee convention (which requires member States on ly to use 'their 
best endeavors, consistent with their respective leg islations to receive refugees': art. 2.1), any 
forcible removal of a refugee to Libya is an unlawful rights-stripping exercise. In any event, 
evidence that Libyan authorities detain and mistreat refugees would trump any prima facie 
argument in favour of requiring refugees to accept 'protection' in Libya predicated on that 
country 's assumption of formal obligations. 
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68 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session, 22nd meeting, UN Doc E/ AC.32/ SR.22 
(14 February1950) 20 (Mr Cuvel ierof Belgium). 
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Another tactic that raises difficult legal issues is the diversion of refugees to a 
non-party State conscripted to act as a buffer(such as Australia's 'Pacific Solution', 
under which refugees were sent to the Pacific Island country of Nauru) . Article 33 is 
not likely infringed if, as in the case of the 'Pacific Solution', the consequence is 
long-term confinement without risk of being sent away to face the risk of being 
persecuted. The best argument against such schemes is rather the duty to ensure 
respect in the destination State for other Refugee Convention rights accrued by the 
sending country's exercise of jurisdiction (and possibly by presence in its territory, 
including its territorial sea). 69 In order to avoid the prospect of rights-stripping, any 
involuntary assignment of protective responsibility must be predicated on 'anxious 
scrutiny',70 not only of respect for the duty of non-rejoulement by the destination 
country, but also for other refugee rights already acquired.71 Responsibility can 
moreover only be shared with another State party to the Refugee Convention, since 
only in such States will the refugee continue to enjoy the acquired rights to UNHCR 
supervision under art. 35 and to international judicial oversight by virtue of art. 38. 
The termination of these means of effecting and enforcing rights following removal 
to a non-party State would be as much a deprivation of rights as is the denial of the 
rights themselves. 
The use of visa controls, often enforced by carrier sanctions, poses a more vexing 
dilemma because jurisdiction over the persons intended to be deterred may never be 
established. While the duty of non-refoulement likely does not apply in such cases, 
reliance on the ICCPR's guarantee to all of the right to leave their own country may, 
in the view of the UN Human Rights Committee, afford a plausible avenue of 
redress.72 
7.3.3. Civil and political rights 
In many instances, the civil rights of refugees, and most certainly their political 
rights, will be more effectively protected under the ICCPR than by reliance on the 
comparatively constrained list of guarantees in the Refugee Convention itself. 
There are three main provisos. 
First, it is important to recognise that generic civil rights are usually afforded to 
non-nationals only on the basis of a guarantee of non-discrimination - that is, 
State parties may still grant refugees and other aliens lesser civil rights than 
nationals so long as the differentiation is adjudged to be 'reasonable and objective'. 
69 Applicarion of the Convention on rhe Prevention and Punishmentofrhe Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Yugosla via) [ 1996] ICJ Rep 595, 652 (Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry). 
70 R v. Secretary of Sratefor the Home Department; Ex pa rte Thangarasa; R v. Secretary of Srarefor the Home 
Department; Ex parte Yogathas [2002] UKHL JG (17 October 2002) [58]. 
71 Plaintiff M70/201 l v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Plaintiff M 106 of201 l v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship [20 11] MCA J2 (JI August 20 11). 
72 Murnan Rights Comminee, General Comment No 27: Freedom of Movement (Article 12), 67th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/ 
21/Rev.1 /Add.9 (2November1999) [10]. 
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Unfortunately, the UN Human Rights Committee has too frequently been prepared 
to see differentiation on the basis of nationality as presumptively reasonable. It has 
also paid insufficient attention to substantive differences that make formal equal-
ity an inadequate response, and has afforded governments an extraordinarily 
broad margin of appreciation, rather than engaging in careful analysis of both 
the logic and extent of the differential treatment. 73 Because the Refugee 
Convention guarantees its more constrained catalogue of civil rights on an abso-
lute basis rather than simply without discrimination, it remains a critical source of 
civil rights entitlement. 
Second, civil rights in the Refugee Convention are not subject to the sort of 
broad-ranging derogation for national emergencies that is provided for in the 
ICCPR. To the contrary, art. 9 of the Refugee Convention allows restrictions on 
refugee rights in the context of 'war or other grave and exceptional circumstances' 
only if such measures are 'essential', not just 'strictly required ' as under the ICCPR. 
Such measures must moreover be individuated ('in the case of a particular person') 
and therefore cannot be collectively imposed on all refugees or even a subset of 
them. Perhaps most importantly, art. 9 of the Refugee Convention does not author-
ise general derogation, but only provisional suspension of rights before formal 
status verification is completed. Once refugee status is confirmed, no further 
suspension of rights is allowed. 
Third, many of the civil rights in the Refugee Convention are framed in ways that 
respond to refugee-sped fie concerns not clearly addressed by general human rights 
norms. For example, there are provisions that explicitly address the right to 
religious education, a matter of clear concern to the Refugee Convention drafters 
in relation to Jewish refugees and other refugee groups of the Second World War 
era. There are also critical provisions on respect for previously acquired forms of 
personal status; strong rules prohibiting ongoing detention and affirming a full 
right to freedom of internal movement; and provisions that ensure that identity and 
travel documents are made available. 
7.3.4. Socio-economic rights 
-----
The primary goal of the drafters of the Refugee Convention was to ensure: 
that the refugees will lead an independent life in the countries which have given them shelter. 
With the exception of the 'hard core' cases, the refugees will no longer be maintained by an 
international organisation as they are at present. They will be integrated in the economic 
system of the countries of asylum and will themselves provide for their own needs and for those 
of their families. 74 
73 Hathaway. Til e Rights of Refugees under Interna tional Law. above n. I, 129 ff. 
74 Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons. 'Memorandum by the Secretary-General' (UN Doc E/AC.32/ 
2, Uni ted Nations. 3 January 1950) 6- 7. 
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It is therefore not surpnsmg that there are very strong guarantees of socio-
economic rights in the Refugee Convention - arguably the most extensive granted 
to any class of non-national, and in one case (the right to private property) actually 
providing for a right not yet guaranteed under general norms of international 
human rights law. 
In contrast to general norms of human rights law, the Refugee Convention's 
socio-economic rights are immediate duties rather than obligations of progressive 
implementation as under art. 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights ('ICESCR'). 75 Most importantly, there is no ability (as there is 
under art. 2(3) of the ICESCR) for poorer countries to deny economic rights to non-
nationals, which is clearly a critical concern as the overwhelming majority of 
refugees are present in such States. 
This is not to say that the Refugee Convention responds to all socio-economic 
rights concerns. For example, the urgency of flight frequently means that most 
refugees in the less developed world are not able to meet their own immediate 
subsistence needs. The drafters of the Refugee Convention paid surprisingly little 
attention to the importance of meeting such basic needs as access to food, water, 
healthcare or shelter. On the other hand, the Convention gives detailed attention to 
a variety of relatively sophisticated socio-economic rights, such as access to social 
security, fair treatment under tax laws, and even the protection of refugees ' 
intellectual property. 
Many of the Refugee Convention 's economic rights are nonetheless of real value 
to modern refugees, in both the developed and less developed worlds. For example, 
the Convention broke with precedent by making a clear commitment to provide at 
least the most basic forms of education to refugees and their children immediately 
upon coming under a State party's authority, and on terms of equality with 
nationals (see Chapter 8). As soon as a refugee has complied with any requirements 
set by the State for seeking validation of the refugee claim, the claimant is entitled 
to engage in self-employment; once recognised as a refugee, rights to undertake 
both wage-earning and professional work ensue. Refugees also enjoy an immediate 
right to acquire both real and personal property, and to benefit from rationing 
systems. Once lawfully staying, refugees are entitled to access public housing, as 
well as public relief and social security systems. 
Because most of these economic rights are framed in contingent terms, they do 
not require a host State to provide refugees with more than they have already 
agreed to provide to other aliens, most-favoured non-nationals or their own 
nationals - thus not imposing an obligation that would amount to a privileging 
of refugees over the host society. Yet by virtue of the same contingencies, refugees 
cannot be disfranchised within their new communities, but rather must be allowed 
75 In ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened fo r signature 16 December 1966. 993 
UNTS 3 (entered into fo rce 3 January 1976). 
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to participate in the economy in a way that genuinely enables them to meet their 
own needs. 
7.3.5. Rights of solution 
There is increasing impatience among States with the duty simply to honour the 
rights of persons who are Refugee Convention refugees. The focus of much con-
temporary discourse is instead on the importance of defining and pursuing so-
called 'durable solutions' to refugee flight. Indeed, those who focus on achieving 
durable solutions increasingly regard respect for refugee rights as little more than a 
second-best option, to be pursued only until a durable solution can be 
implemented. 
In contrast to this emphasis on the pursuit of durable solutions, the Refugee 
Convention gives priority to allowing refugees to make their own decisions about 
how best to respond to their predicament. The only circumstance under which a 
solution to refugee status may lawfully be imposed without the consent of the 
refugee is where there has been a fundamental and demonstrably durable change 
of circumstances in the refugee's State of origin, which has eliminated the 
refugee's need for the surrogate protection at the heart of refugee law. Refugee 
status comes to an end in such a case, and the former refugee may be mandatorily 
returned to the country of origin so long as the requirements of international 
human rights law are met. 76 The label often attached to this option - 'voluntary 
repatriation' - is thus not appropriate. The solution of requiring a refugee's 
departure once the need for protection comes to an end is better referred to 
simply as 'repatriation', thus avoiding confusion with a second solution, 'volun-
tary re-establishment'. 
While repatriation involves the return of a person who is no longer a refugee (and 
hence need not be voluntary), a person who remains a refugee may voluntarily 
decide to re-establish himself or herself in the country of origin despite the risk of 
being persecuted there. A refugee, like any national, is always free in law to opt for 
return to his or her own country. Return under such circumstances, however, must 
be the result of the refugee's free choice if the State of asylum is to avoid breach of 
the duty of non-refoulement. Once there is evidence both of a genuinely voluntary 
return and of the refugee's de facto re-establishment in his or her own country, the 
Refugee Convention deems refugee status to have come to an end. This is so 
because the refugee's own actions signal that he or she no longer wishes to benefit 
from the surrogate protection of an asylum country. 
Beyond repatriation and voluntary re-establishment, the third solution to refu-
gee status is resettlement. This solution acknowledges the reality that time spent in 
an asylum State may afford a refugee the opportunity to explore and secure access 
76 Marjoleine Zieck, UNHCR anti Voluntary Reparriario11 of Refugees: A Legal Analysis (Martinus Nijhoff, 1997). 
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to durable protection options better suited to his or her needs. The Refugee 
Convention explicitly envisages the possibility of onward movement by way of 
resettlement from the first country of arrival, and requires the government in the 
refugee's initial host State to facilitate that process. Once resettlement has occurred, 
the continuing need for refugee protection is at an end. 
Fourth, and as a logical extension of the Refugee Convention 's core commitment 
to affording refugees greater rights as their attachment to the asylum country 
increases over time, a point may be reached where the refugee and the authorities 
of that country agree to the refugee's formal naturalisation by the host State. If a 
refugee opts to accept an offer of nationality there, with entitlement to participate 
fully in all aspects of that State's public life, the need for the surrogate protection of 
refugee law ends. There is no further need for surrogate protection because the 
refugee is able and entitled to benefit from the protection of the new country of 
nationality. 
7.4. CHALLENGES FACING THE REFUGEE REGIME 
Governments of the developed world are now appropriating the language of'burden 
sharing' to further a global apartheid regime under which most refugees remain in 
the less developed world, and do so under conditions that are often rights-abusive, if 
not life-threatening. These States have distorted the true object and purpose of the 
Refugee Convention, erroneously suggesting that it sets only protection obligations 
of 'last resort' - that is, that refugees may be routinely sent away to any other State 
that will admit them without risk of return to their country of origin. Governments 
have further stigmatised refugees who arrive without pre-authorisation as 'illegal', 
despite the fact that the Refugee Convention requires otherwise.77 
Perhaps most disingenuously, these same governments increasingly justify 
their harsh treatment of refugees arriving at their territory on the grounds that 
harshness is the necessary means to a more rational protection end. This end is 
said to be the reallocation of resources towards meeting the needs of the over-
whelming number of refugees located in the less developed world, with resettle-
ment in the developed world being made available only to those with the most 
acute need. 
7.4.1 . The uneven distribution of burdens and responsibilities 
----
There is no doubt that the burdens and responsibilities of offering protection to 
refugees are unfairly apportioned today. Nearly 90 per cent of refugees remain in 
77 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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the less developed world, with some States - Chad, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria - hosting more than one refugee for every hundred nationals. 
In contrast, Canada's ratio is nearly 1 :460; the ratio for the United States and the 
European Union is roughly 1: 1,900; and for Japan, approximately I :41,000.78 Not 
only is the Jess developed world doing the overwhelming share of refugee hosting, 
but it does so with a small fraction of the resources presently allocated to process-
ing and assisting the tiny minority of refugees who reach richer States. In approx-
imate terms, less than 50 US cents per day is available to look after each of the 
refugees under direct UNHCR care in poorer States.79 Not even that tiny budget is 
guaranteed, but has to be garnered each year from the voluntary contributions to 
UNHCR of a small number of wealthier countries (there is no formula-based 
funding arrangement). Meanwhile, developed States spend on average USD 
20,000 just to process the claim of each refugee able to reach them, with additional 
sums for transitional support. 80 As such, the world now spends more than a 
hundred times as much on a refugee arriving in the developed world as it does to 
protect a refugee who remains in the less developed world. 
In such circumstances, it should come as no surprise that the situation of 
refugees in many less developed countries is often dire. In far too many cases, 
rights abuse is rampant and rationalised on the basis of extreme resource shortages. 
There is, thus, a very strong basis to consider apportioning resources more fairly 
relative to needs. To be taken seriously, however, that reallocation needs to be both 
much more significant than in the past and, most fundamentally, binding (in 
contrast to current charity-based models). Countries in regions of origin rightly 
protest that they cannot be expected to admit massive numbers of refugees, to 
whom they thus become legally obligated, on the basis of discretionary grants that 
ebb and flow with the political, budgetary and other preferences of wealthier 
governments. 
More fundamentally still, the rights of refugees in the less developed world are 
not meaningfully vindicated by dollars sent to run UNHCR or other refugee 
camps, where rights abuse is often rampant and opportunities for self-reliance 
usually non-existent. 81 If the transfer of resources is to be meaningful, there must 
be an ability to ensure verifiable respect for refugee Jaw obligations in recipient 
States. 
78 US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 'World Refugee Survey 2009' (US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigra nts, 2009) 31. 
79 At the end of2009, 10.4 million refugees were receiving protection or assistance from UNHCR: United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, '2009 Global Trends' (UNHCR, 15 June 2010) 2. Total programme support expenditures 
in 2009 were USD 1.78 billion: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 'Biennial Programme Budget 
2010- 2011 " (UN Doc A/AC.96/1068, United Nations, 17 September 2009) 60. This equates to USD 172 per refugee 
per year, or approximately 47 cents per day. 
80 Jenny Bedlington , 'Creating Shared Solutions to Refugee Protection: An Agenda for the International Community' 
(Speech delivered at the Advanced Study Center of the International Institute, University of Michigan, 14 April 
2004). 
81 Guglielmo Verdirame and Barbara Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism (Berghahn, 2005). 
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Major Refugee-Hosting Countries Number of Refugees per US$ GDP per capita 
Pakistan 1,900,600 Pakistan 710 
Iran 1,073,400 Congo 475 
Syria 1,005,500 Kenya 247 
Germany Chad 225 
Jordan Syria 191 
Kenya Ethiopia 149 
Chad Bangladesh 132 
China Uganda 108 
us Iran 97 
UK Tanzania 84 
Figure 7 .1 Refugee burden sharing, 2010 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends 201 O (UNHCR, 2011) 
7.4.2. The logic of a shift to common but differentiated responsibility 
The challenge, then, is to reinvigorate international refugee law in a way that States 
continue to see as reconcilable to their self-interests, in particular their migration 
control objectives, yet which does not compromise the right of refugees to access 
true protection. Given the uneven distribution of resources and protective respon-
sibilities, the critical starting point is to acknowledge the Refugee Convention's 
flexibility, which allows State parties to allocate burdens and responsibilities 
among themselves. This process must be a genuine rights-regarding allocation of 
responsibility, not a simple dumping of refugees abroad on the ground that they 
will be admitted and protected from expulsion in the destination country. In 
particular, this operational flexibility may not under any circumstance override 
the core commitments to protection embodied in the Refugee Convention. This 
means that governments must allow access to their territory for all persons who 
wish to claim refugee protection, at least pending an assignment of responsibility, 
and it means that refugees arriving may not be stigmatised as unlawful entrants. It 
also means that account must be taken - both at the site of arrival and in any 
potential State to which protective responsibility is assigned - of the full require-
ments ofrefugee law and international human rights law, notjust of the ability to 
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secure entry and be protected against refoulement. Two cornerstones for a prin-
cipled and meaningful system to share burdens and responsibilities should be 
considered. 82 
The first is to move away from a system of unilateral, state-by-state implemen-
tation of refugee law towards a system of 'common but differentiated responsi-
bility'. The impetus for States to share refugee protection responsibilities would 
come from an appreciation that cooperation offers States a form of collective 
insurance when they, or States with which they have close ties, are faced with a 
significant refugee influx. It is only by ensuring the broad distribution of the 
responsibility of physical protection, and the availability of reliable fiscal support, 
that States will feel able to remain open to the arrival of refugees. 
The precise allocation of burdens and responsibilities should be flexible, but should 
operate against a foundational principle that not even the significant assumption of 
fiscal burdens can justify withdrawing from human protective responsibilities. Every 
State would agree to participate in the sharing of both fiscal burdens and human 
responsibilities, though the precise mix of obligations would vary. Some States might 
focus on providing immediate protection in the wake of a mass influx; others would 
provide protection for the duration of risk; others might concentrate on providing an 
immediate solution for truly difficult cases, or on ensuring access to resettlement 
opportunities for refugees not able to return home within a reasonable time. As all of 
these roles are critical to a sound protection regime, there is no reason why every 
State must take on the same mix of responsibilities. 
The second imperative is to establish a meaningful system to oversee the 
common but differentiated responsibility and resource transfer regimes. The 
approach on the ground should be based on the central importance of ensuring 
refugee autonomy and self-reliance, precisely in line with the rights regime estab-
lished by the Refugee Convention. 
In short, the normative structure of refugee law is sound. There is no need to 
revisit the content of refugee law - thanks to a combination of judicial reinvigora-
tion of the refugee definition, the evolution of powerful general human rights 
standards to buttress the Refugee Convention's own creative rights regime, and the 
rise of ancillary regional protection regimes. But the long-term viability of refugee 
law is under threat from its atomised system of implementation, coupled with the 
absence of a meaningful mechanism to oversee respect for legal obligations and 
facilitate the sharing-out of burdens and responsibilities among State parties. The 
challenge is to update the mechanisms of implementation without undermining the 
ability of refugee law to continue to play its critical role of ensuring surrogate 
national protection to those fundamentally disfranchised by their own country. 
82 A comprehensive model fo r reform is set out in James Hathaway and Alexander Neve, "Making International 
Refugee Law Relevant Agai n: A Proposal fo r Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection · (1 997) IO Ha rvard 
Human Rights Journal 11 5. Relevant social science research is collected in James Hathaway (ed.) , Reco 11ceivi11g 
/nreniational Refagee Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1997). 
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